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Abstract 
System complexity is only one aspect affecting US space acquisition today. There is 
a large body of literature that suggests US space acquisition is over budget, behind 
schedule, and delivering underperforming systems. The GAO seems to attribute a number 
of factors to contributing to this situation. However, three primary factors include an over-
reliance on immature technology, managing requirements to build the “grand design” and 
the health of the space industrial base. Addressing these factors will be critical so that the 
US can maintain its technology superiority and leadership in space. This is especially critical 
as countries such as Russia and China continue to mount significant challenges to our 
dominance in space. A loss of US leadership in space could very well translate into a loss of 
prosperity and national security.   
 
 In this new century, those who effectively utilize space will enjoy added prosperity 
and security and will hold a substantial advantage over those who do not. In order to 
increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and to enhance the national security, 







Since the onset of the Cold War, the United States has led the development of space 
for exploration, commercial uses, and national interests.  In that time, space has managed 
to permeate almost every aspect of our society and culture.  In the span of forty some years, 
space has enabled global communications, broadcasted various forms of entertainment, 
assisted in geolocating new deposits of natural resources such as gas and oil, predicted the 
weather, provided information on our adversaries, and facilitated the conduct of successful 
military operations.   
Despite our success, the national security of the United States faces an increasing 
risk of threat as a number of factors mount a significant challenge to our leadership in 
space.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and others observe that a majority of 
these challenges may lie with our acquisition practices, procedures and policies.  Their 
reviews suggest that many of our developmental national space systems are over budget, 
significantly behind schedule and woefully inadequate in terms of expected user 
performance.  Lt. Gen. Michael Hamel, former commander of Air Force Space and Missile 
Systems Center, was pointed when he stated, “Nothing threatens US military superiority in 
space more than a loss of ability to develop, field and sustain our space systems” (Hamel, 
2009).  
Noting the challenges confronting the US space acquisition program, this paper 
seeks to accomplish three objectives. First, is to briefly explain the importance of US 
leadership in space by describing not only its historical development but also its contribution 
to the prosperity and national security of the United States.  Second, it seeks to explain a 
small subset of the current acquisition challenges the US is facing, to include: dependence 
on immature technology, requirements, and the state of space industrial base. Finally, in 
conjunction with those challenges, this paper offers some modest recommendations that the 
acquisition community might employ to overcome these challenges and ensure US 
leadership in space.   
The Space Development Imperative 
Shortly after World War II, the US became engaged in the Cold War against its 
former ally, the Soviet Union. From a strategic perspective, the US recognized that, first, it 
needed a capable and credible nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union and that, second, 
it needed to understand Soviet military developments and intentions. The development of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) solved the US’s need to deliver nuclear warheads 
half way around the world.  However, on the second issue, it still needed a means of 
obtaining information from denied areas. The shoot down of Gary Powers and his U-2 
aircraft only accentuated the need for space systems capable of accessing denied areas.  In 
other words, space development was the imperative.    
Many organizations had aspirations for and were vying for control of space, and it 
wasn’t until the 1960s that the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 
would become the principal developers of military space power for the nation.  During that 
time, there were rapid advances in communications, weather, navigation, missile warning, 
and intelligence surveillance (Hamel, 2009). These advances continued for the remainder of 
the Cold War. However, these space assets were typically only employed in a strategic and 





the Persian Gulf War, the perspective of using space systems as only strategic and 
operational assets quickly changed.   
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded the Kingdom of Kuwait, and the Iraqi 
government almost immediately annexed Kuwait as the nineteenth province of Iraq.  From 
the early moments of the first Persian Gulf War, it became apparent that satellites were not 
only a force multiplier on the strategic and operation level but also on the tactical level. For 
the first time, satellites connected military forces, sensors, and decision-makers across the 
battlespace; collected data on operationally relevant conditions, reconnoiter, survey and 
target hostile forces; and enabled precision, synchronization and command and control of 
forces in the field (Hamel, 2009).  As a result, Russia and China watched with disbelief as 
the American military easily dismembered and neutralized a Soviet-trained and -equipped 
military in a matter of days.  
Since the close of the Persian Gulf War, the US military has increasingly relied on 
satellites to conduct and facilitate military operations.  Additionally, the nature of warfare has 
evolved as adversaries recognize and attempt to negate the advantage that space systems 
provide for their American users.  As a result, US military forces have asked for increasingly 
complex space systems in greater numbers and on faster timelines to answer the challenge 
posed by adversaries.  This, in part, has contributed to the current state of US space 
acquisition.   
The Acquisition Challenge 
Without significant improvements in the leadership and management of national 
security space programs, U.S. space preeminence will erode ‘to the extent that space 
ceases to provide a competitive national security advantage.’ (Chaplain, 2009) 
Recent studies conducted by the GAO suggest that major weapon system 
acquisition is a serious cause of concern for government leaders.  For example, the GAO 
found that out of the DoD’s portfolio of 96 programs, “42% are higher than originally 
estimated and the average delay in delivering initial capabilities has increased to 22 months” 
(Chaplain, 2009).  Table 1 displays how costs have risen and schedules expanded for “big 





Table 1. Analysis of the DoD’s Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios 
(Francis, 2009) 
Fiscal Year 
 2003 2007 2008 
Portfolio size 
Number of Programs 77 95 96 
Total Planned 
Commitments 
$1.2 Trillion $1.6 Trillion $1.6 Trillion 
Commitments 
Outstanding 
$742.2 Billion $875.2 Billion $786.3 Billion 
Portfolio Indicators 
Change to Total RDT&E 
costs from first estimate 
37% 40% 42% 
Change to Total 
acquisition cost from 
first estimate 
19% 26% 25% 
Total acquisition cost 
growth 
$183 Billion $301.3 Billion $296.4 Billion 
Share of programs with 
25% increase in 
program acquisition unit 
cost growth 
41% 44% 42% 
Average schedule delay 
in delivering initial 
capabilities 
18 Months 21 Months 22 Months 
 Unfortunately, the scenario does not fare much better for space acquisition either, 
as space systems cost estimates have risen dramatically. For example, the US Government 
is already expecting a $10.3 billion cost increase for the years 2009-2013 from original 
estimates (Chaplain, 2009). Obviously, these cost increases divert money away from new or 
existing space programs, making a cash-strapped environment for dollars even more 
competitive.  Figure 1 displays the dramatic rise in cost and schedule delays for specific 






Differences in Total Life-Cycle Program Costs from Program Start and Most 
Recent Estimates  
 (GAO, 2009) 
The GAO has identified specific issues causing significant cost increases and 
schedule delays  as well as presented several best practices they believe might alleviate 
them.  First, the GAO found many acquisition programs begin with an over dependence on 
emerging technology.  If an unexpected delay occurs in the development of the technology, 
it negatively impacts the program schedule (Chaplain, 2009). Second, many programs 
attempt to fulfill all requirements in a single step—that is to suggest that traditional 
acquisition approaches will not work given the current user demands and timelines coupled 
with complex capability. “Programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in 
a single step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the technologies 
necessary to achieve the full capability” (Chaplain, 2009). Finally, the state of the Space 
Industrial Base is questionable.  First-tier contractors are showing only marginal profit 
revenues and can absorb loses as they are diversified across the acquisition market. 
However, a recent Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) survey suggests that second- and 
third-tier contractors are producing miniscule profits. Consequently,  many of these 





Dependence on Emerging Technology 
The GAO found that the DoD has a tendency to fund more programs then they can 
afford.  As a result, many programs come into existence already underfunded.  In fact, in a 
survey presented to space program managers asking what are the top obstacles to 
achieving success, over 36% stated unstable funding (Chaplain, 2006). Additionally, 
programs that are performing well often find funding transferred to an underperforming 
program. This creates a very competitive environment for both program managers and 
contractors. In an attempt to secure as much funding as possible, a program manager will 
often over promise on capability and focuses on “bleeding edge” technologies that seem to 
demonstrate “the most bang for the buck” to those in control of the purse strings.   
Unfortunately, this reliance upon bleeding edge technology comes at a significant 
cost. The GAO has found that developing technology in conjunction with program 
development is often fraught with schedule delays and cost overruns because the relied-
upon technology  often doesn’t work out as intended. In the same survey that measured 
unstable funding as a major obstacle, 18% of space program managers interviewed 
admitted that they relied on immature and untested technology (Chaplain, 2006).  
Specific examples of space programs relying upon immature technology include 
Space Based Infra-Red (SIBRs) satellite system, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
(AEHF) satellite system and the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System (NPOESS).  In some cases, the GAO noted that sensors had not been fully tested 
or even prototyped, or software needs in general were just greatly underestimated 
(Chaplain, 2006). This reliance upon immature technology can, in some part, account for the 
fact that these programs have experienced a cost increase of 40% or more since their 
original cost estimation (Chaplain, 2006). In the case of SBIRs, their costs have more than 
doubled (Chaplain, 2006). 
The GAO has provided two primary recommendations to help alleviate the 
overdependence upon immature technology. First, based upon best industry practices, the 
GAO recommends separating technology development from acquisition development. 
Implied in this concept is that program managers will have to rely upon and select proven 
technology. This leads to their second recommendation, which is to apply the technology 
readiness level (TRL) scale that the DoD “borrowed” from NASA. This rating scale evaluates 
technologies against 9 different levels of developmental maturity. The first level represents 
the least mature technology, whereas the ninth level represents the highest level of 
technological maturity. In the case of space acquisition, the GAO is recommending that 
programs only select and use technology that has reached a technology level of seven.  For 
this particular level, the technology should be tested at least once in an operational 
environment, which is defined as “an environment that addresses all of the operational 
requirements and specifications required of the final systems” (USD(AT&L), 2002). Not 
surprisingly, the DoD has pushed back on this recommendation and offers its own 
recommendation of selecting technology that has reached level six. This level demonstrates 
a prototype or model of a system or subsystem in a relevant end-to-end environment, which 
is described as a test environment that simulates the key aspects of the operational 






Requirements and the Grand Design 
There are several areas of concern with regard to space acquisition and 
requirements. First, as was alluded to earlier, many programs attempt to satisfy all users 
requirements in a single, grand design. Second, users and stakeholders have demonstrated 
a tendency to frequently change or add new requirements as the program is developing. Not 
surprisingly, these factors undoubtedly impact cost and schedule. According to Dr. Rustan, 
Director of Mission Support Directorate, NRO,  
Our requirements-driven stakeholders often do not understand the cost implications 
of the various elements of their respective wish lists, and when we proceed to blindly 
integrate these capabilities, considerable problems develop. This problem is 
exacerbated when we are asked to hold fixed performance, cost and schedule at the 
beginning on any space acquisition, thereby inexorably increasing program risk. 
(Rustan, 2005)  
Attempting to satisfy all stakeholders with a “grand design” is not only costly and has 
a long lead development time but also ineffective and perhaps impossible. Each stakeholder 
comes with their own needs and capabilities, which often come in conflict with other 
stakeholders requirements. For example, United States Southern Command 
(USSOUTHCOM) may come to the NRO and ask for an electrical optical satellite that can 
penetrate through dense jungle foliage. Whereas, United States Pacific Command 
(USPACOM) may ask for a satellite capable of performing broad area searches so they can 
identify ships in transit. Finally, US Central Command (USCENTCOM) may ask for satellite 
that can identify thermal signatures emanating from caves in an attempt to locate terrorist 
safe holds. Thus, designing this satellite becomes inherently complex because different 
technologies are required to achieve each of those capabilities. Not surprisingly, integrating 
these technologies so that they work together not only increases complexity but also 
increases risk to the budget and schedule.   
Stakeholders also have a tendency to add or change requirements during the 
development of the system. According to Dr. Rustan, this may be attributed  to new 
technology that has caught the user’s eye. Dr. Rustan also states that these stakeholders 
are often attempting to solve dynamic problems, problems that change and evolve rapidly 
over time (Rustan, 2005). 
Spiral or Evolutionary development may well help alleviate some these problems. 
These acquisition strategies offer several advantages that seem to address the problems 
that are manifesting themselves in space systems development. More specifically, 
evolutionary acquisition acknowledges that not all requirements in a program are  known up 
front.  Therefore, evolutionary acquisition seeks to divide a program into more manageable 
increments or spirals in which the requirement can be more tightly defined. “Evolutionary 
acquisition’s primary goal is to reduce product cycle times by dividing and phasing 
requirements to produce initial capabilities sooner … EA addresses requirements and 
technology risks by allowing requirements to evolve over time” (Ford & Dillard, 2009). Thus, 
these strategies allow program managers to take a complex design and break it down into 
smaller, more manageable intervals. Additionally, they allow the program manager to 
provide an initial set of capabilities to the user sooner than traditional acquisition 
approaches. The ability to deliver capabilities may also help negate the effects of 





However, there is new evidence suggesting that evolutionary development may 
actually be costlier and longer.  More specifically, modeling and simulation performed by 
David Ford and John Dillard suggests that although spiral development may satisfy first 
phase requirements faster, it certainly is more expensive when compared to traditional 
acquisition approaches.  Further, their modeling also suggests that it takes longer to satisfy 
all requirements when compared with traditional approaches (Ford & Dillard, 2009). See 
Table 2 for their results. Therefore, it would appear a comprehensive evaluation is needed 
to determine if the best practices recommended by the GAO will truly fix space acquisition. 
Table 2. Performance Comparison of Three Simulated Acquisition Projects 
(Ford & Dillard, 2009) 
Performance Measure 
Units of 







Duration to first requirement 
satisfied Weeks 471 470 397 
Duration to maximum 
requirements 
satisfied Weeks 520 518 762 
Total development cost $1.0 Million 722 719 1,555
Requirements satisfied by  
deadline Percent 100 91 18 
Final requirements satisfied Percent 100 91 91 
State of Space Industrial Base 
A robust science, technology, and industrial base is critical for US space capabilities … 
departments and agencies shall … encourage an innovative commercial space sector, 
including the use of prize competitions; and ensure the availability of space related industrial 
capabilities. (Office of Science, 2006) 
When examining the health of the space industrial base there seems to be two 
primary issues. First, is the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) export regulations 
controlled by the US State Department? Second, is their large dependence upon the US 
Government for business and revenue? Specifically, 60% to 65% of sales for the space 
industrial base were from the US Government between the years 2003 to 2006 (Chao, 
2008). In either case, while the first-tier contractors (Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin 
and Boeing) are showing minimal profit margins, the second- and third-tier contractors are 
leaving the industry. They are either going out of business or don’t feel there is enough of a 
business case to continue to engage in space acquisition.  
ITAR is designed to prevent protected technology and munitions from transferring to 
other nations and to enable the US to maintain its technological superiority. It is 
administered by the US State Department and was brought about as a result of Chinese 
technological gains from their observation of US investigative techniques on the failed 
ASTAR II launch (DoD, 1998). Despite its good intentions, strong arguments are arising that 
it is failing to prevent space technology from developing in other nations and is hurting the 





For example, many foreign competitors, such as Thales,  are advertising their 
satellites as ITAR free. The benefit provided here is that foreign companies don’t have to 
progress through a complex and confusing export license process to acquire similarly 
capable components. Additionally, many nations when issuing a request for proposal 
purposely restrict the response to their proposal to less than sixty days. This virtually 
eliminates US firms without having to worry about economic retaliation because US firms 
first have to apply for an export license under ITAR before they can compete. According to a 
recent survey conducted by AFRL, the average turn around time for a license approval was 
106 days in 2006 (Chao, 2008). Thus, it would appear that ITAR is further encouraging US 
firms to remain dependent upon the government as it is increasingly difficult to enter and 
compete in international markets.   
It would also seem that ITAR has encouraged foreign nations to develop their own 
space technology.  For example, we are seeing greater cooperation among foreign 
competitors in space, particularly among the Europeans. Further, China is closing the space 
gap with the US. They have developed their own positional navigational system, conducted 
their first manned space flight, demonstrated a successful space walk and successfully 
tested anti-satellite weapons technology (Chao, 2008). This would suggest that ITAR is not 
achieving its objective of maintaining US technical superiority in space.  
The Department of Defense (DoD) provided a report to the Congress in February 
2006, stating that the aerospace and defense industry was outperforming companies listed 
on the S&P 500 (DeFrank, 2006). As a whole, the industry did seem to outperform the S&P 
500.  However, when looking specifically at the space industry, and especially the second- 
and third-tier suppliers, we see that these companies had significantly lower profit margins.  
A recent survey conducted by Air Force Research Laboratory shows that second- and third-
tier suppliers were only bringing in profit margins of 4% to 6% (Chao, 2008).  These low 
profit margins mean there is less revenue to invest in their personnel and in their research 
and development. Combined with pressures from prime contractors to provide the “best 
possible price,” these companies become less competitive, and, thus, we see a “hollowing 
out [of] the supply chain” (Chao, 2006). Additionally,  the Suppliers Excellence Alliance 
asserts that 50% of all second- and third-tier suppliers will cease to exist by 2011 (Chao, 
2006). This represents a serious problem because the primary contractors subcontract out 
approximately 80% of their space acquisitions to these lower-tiered companies (Chao, 
2008). 
The Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) provides several 
recommendations that may help alleviate the current situation. First, the Department of 
State should conduct a technological review to determine which technologies are critical and 
which ones are not (Chao, 2008). However, simply labeling a satellite as a critical 
technology in its entirety seems counterproductive.  Currently, the US is the only nation in 
the world that labels a satellite as a munition, whereas many European nations designate 
them as dual use technology. Second, provide authority to those entities involved in satellite 
exports to “review cases in a real time, case by case, specific time period” (Chao, 2008). 
Finally, those government entities involved in space acquisition should annually review the 
state of the space industrial base.  
Summary  
Although space acquisition originally provided the US with an advantage in the Cold 





and financial industries, provides entertainment, enables us to communicate half-way 
around the world, provides information on otherwise denied areas, and acts as a force 
multiplier in the conduct of military operations. The Persian Gulf War demonstrated the 
asymmetrical advantage that space systems provided for US forces. As a result, other 
nations made a series of steps and commitments to develop their own space assets. As the 
US became more reliant upon satellite technology, its users began expressing requirements 
for a greater number of systems with far greater capabilities.  
System complexity is only one aspect affecting US space acquisition today. There is 
a large body of literature that suggests US space acquisition is over budget, behind 
schedule, and delivering underperforming systems. The GAO seems to attribute a number 
of factors to contributing to this situation. However, three primary factors include an over-
reliance on immature technology, managing requirements to build the “grand design” and 
the health of the space industrial base.  
Addressing these factors will be critical so that the US can maintain its technology 
superiority and leadership in space. This is especially critical as countries such as Russia 
and China continue to mount significant challenges to our dominance in space. A loss of US 
leadership in space could very well translate into a loss of prosperity and national security.   
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